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Public policy supports biofuels for their benefits to agricultural economies, energy security and 
the environment. The environmental rationale is premised on greenhouse gas (GHG, "carbon") 
emissions reduction, which is a matter of contention. This issue is challenging to resolve because 
of critical but difficult-to-verify assumptions in lifecycle analysis (LCA), limits of available data 
and disputes about system boundaries. Although LCA has been the presumptive basis of climate 
policy for fuels, careful consideration indicates that it is inappropriate for defining regulations. 
This paper proposes a method using annual basis carbon (ABC) accounting to track the stocks 
and flows of carbon and other relevant GHGs throughout fuel supply chains. Such an approach 
makes fuel and feedstock production facilities the focus of accounting while treating the CO2 
emissions from fuel end-use at face value regardless of the origin of the fuel carbon (bio- or 
fossil). Integrated into cap-and-trade policy and including provisions for mitigating indirect land-
use change impacts, also evaluated on an annual basis, an ABC approach would provide a sound 
carbon management framework for the transportation fuels sector.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Biofuels have entered the transportation energy portfolio for several reasons including reduction 
of dependence on petroleum imports (Duffield and Collins 2006). This energy security rationale 
dovetails with other policy goals of bolstering markets for farm commodities, lowering the need 
for crop support programs and fostering rural economic development (Brown 2008). Biofuels 
have also been promoted for environmental reasons, including reduction of greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions, but that issue has become controversial. Differences in view regarding net 
energy and GHG benefits compared to petroleum fuels were reviewed by Farrell et al. (2006), 
for example, who concluded that corn ethanol had modest net GHG benefits based on a meta-
analysis of traditional fuel lifecycle analysis (LCA) studies. LCA methods have since been 
adapted for the purpose of regulating GHG emissions in fuel policy, as seen in California's Low-
Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS; CARB 2009), the U.S. Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS; EPA 
2010) and the European Union's Renewable Energy Directive (RED; EU 2009).  
The sufficiency of standard fuel LCA methods, which only count direct, supply-chain impacts, 
has been questioned, however. As U.S. regulators noted, "it has become increasingly apparent 
that this type of first order or attributional lifecycle modeling has notable shortcomings" (EPA 
2009: 25021). Attributional LCA does not count indirect, economically induced impacts that 
occur as a consequence of commodity market effects. It therefore misses the emissions due to 
indirect land-use change (ILUC) and the associated release of carbon stocks (Searchinger et al. 
2008; McCarl 2008). This leakage effect is worrisome for tropical forests, which are falling 
under expansions of land use for settlement, forestry and agriculture as driven by multiple factors 
(Geist and Lambin 2002). Regulators have therefore broadened the scope of LCA, expanding its 
boundaries both spatially and temporally (CARB 2009; EPA 2009, 2010). Such consequential 
LCA incorporates aggregate estimates of global commodity market interactions. As applied in 
regulation to date, it entails assumptions about discounting and how long it takes to pay back the 
"carbon debt" associated with land-use change (Fargione et al. 2008; Gibbs et al. 2008).  
This more expansive form of LCA entails not only difficult-to-verify (and often unverified) 
assumptions about numerous critical aspects of GHG emissions associated with feedstock and 
fuel production, but also inherently unverifiable assumptions about future impacts pertaining to 
land-use effects and carbon uptake. Nevertheless, such methods underpin the use of biofuels for 
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compliance with U.S. carbon-related fuel policies including the U.S. RFS and California LCFS. 
Although not yet part of the European Union's RED, consequential LCA results for ILUC are 
being considered for expanding that policy's sustainability guidelines.  
These issues highlight the limitations of conventional energy policy thinking regarding 
renewable versus fossil fuels. The biofuels conundrum can be seen as part of the broader 
challenge of jointly managing the carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrous oxide (N2O) and other GHG 
impacts from stocks and flows in coupled energy and land-use systems globally (Wise et al. 
2009; Melillo et al. 2009). From the perspective of resource economics, it is not obvious that 
LCA is the right tool for regulation. A policy analytic justification for regulatory application of 
LCA is strikingly absent from the literature, although criticisms are starting to appear (Holland et 
al. 2009). Proponents simply have asserted that policy should be based on LCA (e.g., DeCicco & 
Lynd 1997; Sperling & Yeh 2009), apparently assuming that its utility as a technology 
assessment tool implies its value as a regulatory tool.  
Upon reflection, policy is best defined using current-period accounting of carbon stocks and 
flows, ideally with direct, measurement-based, verifiable tallies of GHG emissions from the 
production and use of all fuels and feedstocks. Reflecting the rubric, "what gets measured, gets 
managed," it would motivate all entities in fuel supply chains to minimize the emissions under 
their control, i.e., within the scope of their operations, but avoid regulating entities for impacts 
beyond their control. The policy should also mitigate any remaining emissions, such as leakages 
caused by market-induced ILUC that no particular entity controls. In short, it should establish a 
carbon management paradigm that provides incentives to minimize emissions from both fuel 
production and fuel consumption regardless of what the fuel is called.  
Although fully establishing this ideal will not be possible initially, climate protection is best 
served by putting its elements in place from the inception of a policy regime rather than using 
approaches such as LCA that are poorly grounded in the principles of sound environmental 
management. Careful carbon accounting has been the presumed basis of cap-and-trade programs 
as envisioned by the Kyoto Protocol and advocated as the best approach for national climate 
policy (Stavins 2007). Although the approach discussed here is ideally suited for use within a 
cap-and-trade program, the principles also apply to other forms of policy, such as direct 
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regulation (e.g., under the U.S. Clean Air Act), carbon taxation, or a sectoral hybrid policy that 
might combine approaches (e.g., Nordhaus & Danish 2003).  
CARBON ACCOUNTING ISSUES 
Effective carbon management must ultimately rely on in situ measurement of stocks and flows 
on a regular basis with what can be termed annual basis carbon ("ABC") accounting. Here 
"carbon" refers to all GHGs of concern and "annual" means yearly or other relatively short 
period, e.g., five years for tracking changes in carbon stocks and analyzing data over multiple 
growing seasons. Such a system would be "count as you go," without society assuming risks of 
carbon debt based on judgments about discount rates and acceptable payback times.  
ABC accounting underpins cap-and-trade policy as defined to date for fossil CO2 emissions. 
Applying it is straightforward for stationary sources, such as power plants and industrial 
facilities, and for end-use CO2 from transportation fuels, where simple chemistry enables 
accurate measurement through points of fuel distribution in lieu of vehicle tailpipes. Emissions 
inventories are tied to real sources rather than to the LCA abstraction of "carbon footprint," and 
greater clarity is afforded to the question of which entities can be reasonably held accountable 
for what emissions.  
ABC accounting with appropriate reporting periods can also apply for managing carbon stocks 
and sinks (Reilly & Asadoorian 2007). Although these issues are treated by more complex 
methods under the Kyoto Protocol, the result is erroneous carbon accounting for bioenergy 
(Searchinger et al. 2009) and other inconsistencies (Reilly et al. 2007). The need to rethink 
climate policy for biofuels relates directly to the need to rethink it more broadly with respect to 
the inherent coupling of land use to energy systems involved when substituting biological 
resources for fossil resources (Wise et al. 2009). Although measuring terrestrial impacts is 
difficult, attempting to handle these issues through LCA rather than ABC accounting does not 
avoid the difficulties. However, it can confuse matters by fostering debates about what and how 
to model and, perhaps more seriously, by tempting policymakers to rely on negotiated modeling 
results rather than developing sound measurement programs.  
Traditional methods of energy policy analysis, including fuels LCA, neglect the linkage of 
energy systems, both fossil and renewable, to land, with its implications for the global carbon 
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cycle and, more broadly, to nitrogen, water and other terrestrial cycles affecting climate 
(Delucchi 2010). Nevertheless, these incomplete methods have shaped public thinking and 
policymaking to date. A key defect is the automatic crediting of biogenic carbon, that is, the 
assumption that biofuel use directly emits no net CO2 because its molecular carbon was recently 
absorbed from the atmosphere. That convention looks narrowly at energy-related fluxes while 
neglecting carbon stocks.  
By assuming automatic crediting, GHG emissions caps as proposed to date cover only the fossil-
based carbon in fuels. Although some production-phase biofuel emissions are covered, such as 
those from fossil fuels and fossil-derived inputs used by farms and biorefineries, failing to cover 
use-phase biogenic CO2 creates an incentive for biofuels regardless of their actual climatic 
impacts. Automatic crediting is also used in lifecycle-based regulation as applied in California's 
LCFS and the expanded RFS. Having omitted biogenic CO2 emissions from end-use 
consumption, these LCA-based policies attempt to account for production and indirect emissions 
through an expansive regulatory reach, asserting that all emissions can be addressed through the 
single metric of fuel carbon intensity (e.g., gCO2eq/MJ). Such an expansion of system 
boundaries from attributional analysis into what of necessity becomes a consequential analysis is 
then subject to criticism as a marked departure from International Standards Organization (ISO) 
guidelines for LCA (Dale 2009).  
While technically correct in LCA, automatic crediting of biogenic carbon obscures responsibility 
for the physical sources of emissions in the fuel's lifecycle. The result is a misplaced burden of 
proof. Fuel product suppliers and consumers are relieved of responsibility for the definite, direct 
CO2 emissions at end-use. However, the responsibility for the substantial emissions (direct and 
indirect, CO2 as well as N2O and other impacts) associated with the credited carbon uptake is 
passed off through the long, convoluted, dynamic and currently untraceable supply chains for 
feedstocks and other inputs. Arguments then ensue about who is responsible for what portions of 
emissions and how to expand LCA system boundaries (spatially and temporally) to adequately 
account for all impacts. The debate has become particularly fraught for ILUC, which greatly 
influences estimates of GHG intensity. Not surprisingly, expansive LCA-based regulations have 
met strong opposition from the affected industries (Geman 2009; Guerrero 2010).  
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ELEMENTS OF A FUELS CARBON MANAGEMENT POLICY  
In contrast to an LCA-based policy, a policy that follows principles of ABC accounting would 
not attempt to handle all fuel-related GHG emissions through a single mechanism. An ABC-
based approach is described by DeCicco (2009), which illustrates its application with a 
quantitative example using data from a detailed case study of a U.S. ethanol facility. Although 
further analysis and development are needed, the approach can be outlined as having three main 
elements. These are: (1) full accounting of CO2 emissions from fuel end-use regardless of the 
fuel's origin; (2) an attributional accounting protocol that relies on facilities-level GHG balances 
to report net CO2 uptake and track otherwise unregulated GHG emissions throughout fuel and 
feedstock supply chains; and (3) a mechanism for mitigating consequential impacts, particularly 
the leakage due to ILUC.  
Counting end-use CO2 "emissions certain" 
A foundation of sound policy is treating all CO2 emissions that occur in the transportation sector 
at face value. For biofuels, this means counting their direct emissions to the atmosphere without 
automatic crediting of biogenic carbon. This aspect of policy design is applicable regardless of 
the overall climate policy whether it is carbon taxation, GHG emissions regulation using 
traditional source controls (e.g., "non-market" approaches under the U.S. Clean Air Act), or cap-
and-trade. Implementing this element of a policy requires the correct point of regulation (POR), 
which cannot be located too far upstream. Because transportation fuels supplied to end users may 
contain components (such as ethanol, biodiesel or bio-based compounds) blended into fuel 
products at distribution terminals, the POR should be the point of finished fuel distribution. This 
POR is the same as that traditionally used for fuel properties regulation by the U.S. EPA (CFR 
2009).  
Abandoning an automatic credit for biogenic carbon may seem disconcerting to some analysts, 
but it is the only way to define a consistent GHG accounting framework without resorting to 
unverifiable assumptions about the extent of net carbon uptake that complicate other approaches. 
It is not tantamount to putting part of the agricultural sector under a carbon cap or other form of 
GHG regulation. Rather, it is a more accurate specification of how GHG controls apply to the 
transportation sector. After all, the CO2 from vehicle tailpipes is an "emissions certain" (a well-
defined quantity of molecular CO2 entering the atmosphere) regardless of the source of the 
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carbon in the fuel. In contrast, it is the extent of net uptake after accounting for both process 
emissions and leakage that is highly uncertain. Nevertheless, if all fuel carbon (biogenic and 
fossil) is regulated equally, biofuel suppliers will see the same market value for their product 
under climate policy as they see without it. Biofuel suppliers would not be competitively 
disadvantaged by the policy, but neither would they see the unconditional increase in value for 
biofuels that occurs with automatic crediting.  
Tracking facility-level GHG balances 
The second element of an ABC-based approach is a protocol for tracking carbon uptake and 
uncapped GHG emissions in biofuel and feedstock supply chains. Such a protocol would enable 
producers to obtain a verifiable credit for net carbon uptake in biofuel or fuel feedstock products. 
It would use strictly attributional accounting and entail reporting GHG balances at a local facility 
level, where facility here includes farms, managed forests or other sources of biofeedstock as 
well as biorefineries and processing plants.  
Facility system boundaries are well defined and facility-level GHG fluxes and stock changes are 
in principle measurable, even though doing so is challenging for some important sources such as 
soil carbon and N2O. In such cases, circumscribed models using local data could be applied to 
estimate GHG impacts that cannot be directly measured. This narrow use of modeling differs 
from its sweeping use in LCA-based regulation which, by trying to cover all options regardless 
of their empirical basis, ends up relying on broadly defined default values for generic feedstock-
fuel pathways. The resulting adverse selection risk and other points of contrast between the 
approach outlined here and LCA regulation are discussed further below. For the biogenic carbon 
in a feedstock, measurement is straightforward and the data can be used to define the quantity of 
carbon uptake from which facility-level GHG emissions are debited unless they are already 
covered by a broader climate policy, e.g., through direct regulation, carbon taxation or allowance 
submission required elsewhere under a cap (as for purchased electricity).  
In the case of cap-and-trade and barring direct GHG regulation of agriculture (which has not 
been seriously proposed), climate policy will affect agriculture indirectly through carbon price 
impacts on fossil-based inputs and the potential for income opportunities from offsets (Adams 
2009). With agriculture and forestry unregulated, net carbon uptake tracking using facilities-level 
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GHG balances would be voluntary. But with CO2 uptake no longer automatically credited in 
regulated fuel end-use sectors, the burden of proof shifts to feedstock producers. Although 
producers would have an incentive to document net uptake, they would not have a reporting 
obligation. CO2 uptake and uncapped emissions tracking would be required only if a producer 
wishes to realize credit in the carbon-constrained fuels end-use market. Although such a policy is 
not perfect in the sense of immediately regulating all fuel-related emissions, it does avoid the 
egregious problems due to automatic crediting.  
Applying the net uptake crediting protocol at the facility level will reveal -- and enable policy to 
exploit -- real-world variability. This is another key distinction from the process-based approach 
of LCA regulations. For example, the U.S. RFS treats all corn the same, avoiding any look at the 
variability in, say, N2O emissions for different locations, growing conditions, fertilizing 
practices, and so on (EPA 2009). LCA-based policies also treat biorefining according to generic 
process characteristics, using "check box" methods that ignore the variability in emissions for a 
given process at different facilities, which can vary both locally and temporally according to 
market conditions, changes in inputs and changes in product mix. In contrast, a protocol based on 
annual facility-level reporting will foster scientific GHG management, which entails observing 
variability to enable selection of best practices.  
The stated reason for not differentiating given feedstocks within a country is that they are 
fungible commodities (EPA 2009: 25022). However, this need not be a barrier; data on net 
carbon uptake could be incorporated into commodity trading contracts, as proposed for handling 
broader sustainability criteria for biofuels (Mathews 2008). Developing mechanisms to track 
emissions impacts through supply chains will be essential for rational GHG management of 
liquid fuels, which are likely to remain fungible commodities regardless of the source.  
Addressing emissions from indirect land-use change 
The final part of a policy is a mechanism for addressing leakage, specifically emissions from 
ILUC. Although estimates vary, ILUC is large enough to greatly influence the net GHG impact 
of biofuels (Melillo et al. 2009). The many assumptions that go into estimating it result in ILUC 
uncertainties greatly dominating LCA-based policy results (Plevin et al. 2010; Mullins et al. 
2011). It is mediated by price signals tied to demand for agricultural and forestry products. If the 
DeCicco -- Biofuels and Carbon Management p. 9 / 21 
biofuel-related portion of this price signal were neutralized, or an equal-and-opposite signal 
created for protecting forests, then that would be a way to mitigate emissions from ILUC.  
One option for doing so could be a Land Protection Fund (LPF) for purchasing international 
forest carbon offsets in proportion to the ILUC emissions estimated to occur as a consequence of 
biofuel production. The LPF would be administered at the national level, commensurate with the 
scale and type of a nation's biofuel use, and designed to leverage programs for Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) being developed internationally 
(Gibbs et al. 2007). REDD is based on the body of work that emphasizes the importance of 
financial incentives for protecting forests (Gullison et al. 2007; Mollicone et al. 2007).  
The LPF should not come at the expense of other REDD funding. To the extent that biofuel 
production indirectly exacerbates deforestation, funds for REDD should be increased beyond 
what is otherwise deemed appropriate. A number of options can be explored for financing the 
LPF, an issue that is left for future work. The requisite mitigation levels can be estimated using 
same models now applied to incorporate ILUC into regulations. Applying these methods to 
determine ILUC mitigation needs at a national scale is arguably a more appropriate use of such 
highly aggregate global models than reducing their results to product-specific values for LCA-
based regulations such as an LCFS or RFS.  
DISCUSSION 
One way to look at the approach outlined here is as a deconstruction of LCA for the purpose of 
practical carbon management. It enables the use of insights from LCA without encumbering 
policy with the liabilities of LCA, chief among which are the compounding uncertainties that 
result from reliance on modeling and the indeterminacy that is introduced because of the need for 
consequential analysis to address leakage. However, questions can be raised regarding just how 
much an ABC approach ultimately differs from LCA; whether the mitigation fund for addressing 
ILUC would enable fuel suppliers to merely "buy their way out" of enforceable emissions 
reductions; and the extent to which the resulting policy would provide enough incentive to bring 
"truly low carbon fuels" to market.  
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How this approach differs from LCA 
The approach outlined here shares with LCA a common ideal of accounting for all GHG 
emissions associated with the production and use of fuel. However, it differs in key ways, the 
most important of which is rooted in the fact that it does not automatically credit biogenic 
carbon. Under ABC accounting, biofuel end-use CO2 emissions are fully covered whether or not 
biofuel and feedstock suppliers "opt-in" to the emissions tracking protocol. Conversely, the 
LCFS or other LCA-based policy presumption that biofuel carbon was recently absorbed from 
the atmosphere sets up a serious adverse selection risk regarding the accuracy of imputed supply-
chain emissions, for which verification is not required, as well as the need to address ILUC 
leakage through highly uncertain consequential analyses and inherently non-empirical judgments 
about how to amortize carbon debt.  
Another way to view the difference is by contrasting the product focus of LCA with the source 
focus of an ABC framework. With source-based accounting, the focus is on the specific locations  
("facilities" as termed above) where GHG emissions and CO2 uptake occur (sources and sinks, 
respectively). Thus, an ABC approach does not account for everything in one place as does a 
policy based on LCA, which analytically collapses all of the sources and sinks in a product's 
supply chain to the single, product-focused metric of carbon intensity. Although automatic 
crediting of biogenic carbon is arithmetically correct for the "cradle-to-grave" abstraction of a 
biofuel's lifecycle, it codifies a misplaced burden of proof as previously noted.  
An ABC accounting structure reflects the fact that locations of biofuel CO2 uptake (feedstock 
sinks) are remote from the locations of end-use CO2 emissions (biofuel combustion sources). 
Whether or not biofuel and feedstock suppliers provide verifiable data on facility-level GHG 
balances, biofuel end-use emissions are covered, while they are not covered in a product-focused 
LCA policy. Neither are they covered in cap-and-trade systems that follow the Kyoto Protocol's 
convention of treating bioenergy as carbon neutral; such versions of cap-and-trade are 
incompletely source-based because of the exception they make for bioenergy products. An ABC 
policy admittedly entails a very high burden of proof for biofuel net CO2 uptake, a situation that 
is arguably appropriate given that agricultural and forestry systems are presently unmanaged as 
far as GHG emissions are concerned.  
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Moreover, the source-based approach of an ABC policy does not fundamentally rely on a need 
for baselines because it is not attempting to treat the issue as an offsets problem. Thus, it is not 
concerned with the local additionality of CO2 uptake in biofuel feedstock. That uptake is 
straightforward to measure based on the chemical carbon composition of the biomass used for 
biofuel production. Because the policy is not product focused, a GHG reduction associated with 
the use of a biofuel product is not computed in the ABC framework, and so an additionality test 
is not applicable. ILUC effects, which some might view as a lack of additionality globally, are 
treated strictly as leakage.  
That being said, important practical aspects of measuring facility-level GHG balances will 
involve local modeling and a need for local baselines, e.g., for estimating net stock changes in 
managed forests or net effects on soil carbon and other important fluxes such as N2O emissions. 
Such estimates could rely on use of models such as DAYCENT (e.g., Del Grosso et al. 2008), 
but rather than assuming national or broad regional-scale values as now used for LCA-based 
policy, these techniques would be applied with local and seasonal inputs for soil type and 
composition, precipitation, and other key variables including management practices. This 
approach would encourage localized applications of such modeling as well as field work to 
improve the measurement basis for the modeling. It would also position regulators to accept or 
reject the resulting farm, forest and other facility-level GHG balance data based on its quality, as 
opposed to being forced to rely on defaults in the absence of localized estimates.  
The distinction can also be seen in the different starting points for ABC policy versus LCA 
policies. The latter claim to cover all fuels, in the case of an LCFS, or all (other than 
grandfathered) biofuels, in the case of the U.S. RFS and EU RED, and so start with a complete 
reliance on default values and other sweeping assumptions for the GHG emissions associated 
with feedstocks and fuels. Modeled GHG reductions are thereby assumed for biofuels without 
any "on-the-ground" verification and involve the inherently non-empirical convention of 
amortizing carbon debt over future periods. In contrast, the starting place for an ABC-based 
policy presumes no GHG reductions from the use of biofuels. Net uptake crediting would have to 
be developed "from the ground up," using the facility-level GHG balances as outlined above, and 
as part of a system that includes an explicit mechanism for countering the market pressures that 
lead to emissions leakage. Such a system can be initiated at a small scale with a few producers 
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able to prove out the procedures, permitting oversight of early efforts to develop and implement 
the facility-level GHG balance protocols by agencies and third-party auditors whose methods can 
be tested, refined and validated for broader use.  
Reduction obligations vs. leakage mitigation  
Because the ABC framework treats leakage as a problem to be mitigated rather than attempting 
to incorporate its effects as adjustments to the level of GHG reduction assigned to biofuels, it can 
be criticized as providing a buy-out mechanism for biofuel and fossil fuel suppliers without 
enforcing any actual emission reductions. This criticism can be leveled at any form of climate 
policy that includes a trading mechanism. The common response is that because the shared 
atmosphere makes the location of GHG emissions immaterial, the problem reduces to one of 
ensuring the integrity of trades and offsets. That is an issue that receives considerable attention of 
itself. This proposal's reliance on REDD for addressing ILUC leakage would exploit the ongoing 
effort by researchers and policymakers to maximize the effectiveness of REDD for protecting 
forest carbon stocks, a process that developed in recognition of the limitations of project-based 
approaches for terrestrial offsets.  
The magnitude of ILUC and the resulting leakage tied to biofuel use is highly uncertain and a 
question that cuts to the heart of debates about the role of the biosphere in climate protection  
(Righelato & Spracklen 2007). Nevertheless, studies indicate that its magnitude is large enough 
to negate the GHG reduction benefits of current biofuels relative to fossil fuels over multi-decade 
timeframes (Gibbs et al. 2008; Melillo et al. 2009; Plevin et al. 2010). LCA-based policies 
finesse this problem by the accounting device of spreading the large CO2 releases from carbon 
stock changes during a current period over longer periods, such as 30 years for the U.S. RFS and 
California LCFS policies or 20 years for recent EU analyses undertaken for the RED (JRC-IE 
2010).  
For example, a recent estimate for the ILUC emissions impact of U.S. corn ethanol is roughly 
800 gCO2/MJ (Hertel et al. 2010). This value is an order of magnitude greater than the direct, 
end-use combustion only emissions of 72 gCO2/MJ for either ethanol or gasoline. Only through 
amortization, e.g., over 30 years to yield a value of 30 gCO2/MJ as in the California LCFS, can 
the estimated lifecycle ILUC impacts be made numerically small enough for the biofuel to 
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appear to offer a reduction relative to fossil fuel. As a result, such LCA-based policies provide an 
incentive for greater use of biofuels, exacerbating leakage while incurring a significant risk that 
its magnitude may be even greater than that estimated through the very uncertain modeling 
(Mullins et al. 2011).  
In contrast, an ABC policy does not privilege biofuels in a way that risks added leakage, and so 
an LPF would not need to address leakages as large as those risked by LCA policies that 
amortize large current-period stock changes over multi-decade future periods. Biofuel use 
unrelated to climate policy (i.e., as mandated for other reasons regardless of GHG emissions) 
arguably incurs no leakage problem as such, just the same (large) problem of induced 
consumption-related emissions driven by growing demand for agricultural and other products in 
carbon-unconstrained economies globally. For example, no one claims a GHG reduction when 
consuming grains for food or feed, and so leakage is not an issue; the problem arises when 
attempting to claim an emissions reduction from grain-based biofuel. The leakage concern arises 
when claiming an emissions reduction, a problem which is in turn an artifact of using a product-
focused as opposed to a source-focused framework for policy.  
Some might view ILUC as only a special case of the more general problem of leakage, which 
occurs when consumption in a carbon-regulated economy induces carbon-intensive production in 
an unregulated trading partner or when regulation of carbon-intensive industries causes 
production to shift to unregulated locations. Thus, other mechanisms might be considered for 
counteracting it, such as border adjustment taxes or programs to motivate offsetting emissions 
reductions in countries where the emissions due to leakage occur. None of these mechanisms are 
problem-free, and the considerations of economic efficiency, flexibility and minimizing trade 
barriers tend to argue for incentive measures over border adjustments (Winchester et al. 2010). 
Moreover, the nature of particular leakage problems and their effects on interest groups also 
factor into the choice of mechanism. For example, trade-exposed industries may not be satisfied 
to know that the emissions leakages have been handled when they still face a competitive loss of 
business; they may therefore prefer mechanisms using border taxes, rebates or allowance 
allocations. Given that the major leakage concern for biofuels is tied to the risk to forests or other 
terrestrial carbon stocks, and that there are other good reasons to protect those resources, a 
mitigation mechanism that targets forest protection seems appropriate.  
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Although this paper focuses on biofuels, similar considerations apply to bioenergy in general. 
Note also that the direct uptake crediting protocol is not the same as treating biofuels as a carbon 
offset. Although it can draw on the measurement and verification techniques developed for 
agricultural offsets accounting, the protocol outlined here yields a direct, annual measure of net 
carbon uptake, rather than an emissions reduction relative to some baseline, and so avoids the 
need for tests of additionality and permanence.  
Technology change and market transparency 
The voluntary facility-level GHG balance tracking outlined here will probably only motivate 
reporting by producers whose verifiable net carbon uptake is large enough to make it worthwhile 
for them to opt into the system. Nevertheless, it will foster the beginning of measurement-based 
GHG management in biofuel and feedstock production. Such a policy would harness approaches 
like those already used to enhance agricultural productivity by engaging producers, related 
businesses, extension services and agricultural researchers in a search for low-GHG solutions. A 
net carbon uptake crediting system coupled to a cap or other form of energy sector carbon 
regulation will create a market pull for emerging technologies such as cellulosic processing or 
biotechnologies with minimal land requirements while providing an incentive to improve the 
"carbon efficiency" of mature technologies that exist at scale today.  
Advocates of the LCFS or other LCA-based fuels policies assert its importance as a technology-
forcing mechanism for "low-carbon fuels," assuming that the carbon price signal from general 
climate policy will be too weak to motivate technology change (Sperling & Yeh 2009). If the 
climate policy is in fact poorly specified, e.g., by excluding biogenic carbon, by setting the point 
of regulation too far upstream from actual fuel assembly and distribution processes, and by 
lacking a rigorous mechanism for tracking GHG impacts in the supply chain, then such concerns 
are justified. However, the approach outlined here tightens the policy specification, ensures 
transparency and avoids loopholes that would indeed enable a transportation fuel supplier to 
merely pass the price through to consumers without incurring a risk that a competitor will find a 
lower cost way to measurably limit emissions.  
Moreover, given the overwhelming uncertainties and lack of transparency inherent in specifying 
policy through LCA, it is difficult to have confidence in the results. The ABC approach outlined 
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here would accurately expose the fuel supply and use systems to a carbon price signal, leading to 
greater confidence that whatever changes are motivated, they will tangibly limit emissions. If as 
a result of such a policy, including its mechanism for countering leakage, more land is devoted to 
protecting or rebuilding carbon stocks than is used to grow feedstocks for biofuels, that may well 
be the superior "technological" outcome as far as climate is concerned. In short, policy should be 
premised on measurable emissions limitations achieved in current periods rather than wishful 
thinking about fuels that might someday avoid more emissions in the future than they actually 
cause today. Far from being technology neutral as its proponents claim, policy specified through 
LCA picks presumed "winners" using prospective analysis that is built upon layers of 
technology-specific feedstock and fuel pathway assumptions. Because it avoids automatic 
crediting of biogenic uptake, an ABC approach takes a precautionary stance in keeping with a 
principle of "above all do no harm," unlike LCA policies which entail numerous unverified 
assumptions and so risk harm in the form of both direct and indirect GHG emissions resulting 
from an expanded use of fuels qualified through assumptions.  
Managing emissions instead of disputing fuels 
Indeed, a perhaps surprising aspect of the approach outlined here is that it does not involve 
explicit comparison of fuels. With all molecular carbon treated equally as a source of CO2 
emissions certain during fuel use, attention turns to handling production phase emissions by 
tracking carbon uptake and unregulated GHG impacts in the supply chain in addition to an 
overall climate policy's presumed coverage of major industrial sources. The focus is on facilities 
where emissions actually occur rather than on products to which emissions are imputed through 
LCA. Moreover, because liquid fuels and their feedstocks are fungible commodities, it is unclear 
that differentiating them with a product-based metric is as effective as pricing their production-
related emissions, which an ABC approach would achieve by exposing fuel supply chains to a 
carbon price signal whether derived explicitly from a carbon market or a carbon tax or implicitly 
from direct GHG regulation.  
From a deeper perspective, attempting to regulate fuels through LCA can be seen as premised on 
a "fallacy of misplaced concreteness" (Whitehead 1927). A form of logical reification, this 
mistake involves treating an abstract construct (in this case, a fuel's lifecycle GHG emissions) as 
if it were a concrete physical property (such as a fuel's chemical composition). Seen in this light, 
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LCA-based regulation is an unproven and radical departure from traditional environmental 
policy based on measured substances or impacts of concern. For biofuels, the key impacts occur 
at fields and facilities; those locations are the sources of physical emissions that must be 
measured to ensure transparency. Carbon intensity is purely notional; it cannot be measured in a 
repeatable way as can, for example, limits on sulfur or other chemical specifications for fuels. 
Although ILUC brings the issue to a head, the uncertainty and variability of many other 
production-related emissions are also problematic. The high degree of abstraction entailed in 
lifecycle GHG estimates is clear in the CARB (2009) and EPA (2009; 2010) documents, which 
reveal how regulatory compliance heavily depends on numerous modeling assumptions, the vast 
majority of which have not been verified, many of which are practically impossible to verify, and 
some of which (such as those for amortizing carbon debt) are inherently not empirical yet have a 
great influence on the results.  
In contrast, a GHG management policy using current-period, facilities-based ABC accounting 
does not require assumptions about emissions reductions based on abstract estimates of complex 
systems and their spatial and temporal behavior. Neither does it require resolving long-running 
debates about the climate benefits of biofuels. Rather, it acknowledges the reality of biofuels in 
the marketplace and the fact that neither fossil fuel supply systems nor agricultural systems have 
been carbon constrained to date. A cap-based policy using ABC accounting can co-exist with the 
RFS or other biofuel mandates while avoiding the need for GHG lifecycle regulations in an RFS 
or LCFS. As a rational system for carbon management, it would create incentives for lower net 
GHG emitting options regardless of their form and whatever their emissions may be today, 
recognizing that some of the most cost-effective opportunities for limiting emissions may well be 
found through scientific management of existing GHG-intensive systems.  
While climate protection may have been a rationale for promoting biofuels, an unvarnished 
political analysis shows that support for biofuels rests on their value for rural economic 
development -- an important interest in most political systems -- amplified by concerns about 
energy security. Although many environmentalists promoted biofuels (e.g., NRDC 2005), 
climate concerns are not a foundation for biofuels policy. For example, legislation that expanded 
the RFS passed the U.S. Senate with a vote of 86-8 (Sissine 2007), clearly supported by many 
members opposed to climate policy per se.  
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CONCLUSION 
While further analysis and development are needed for the approach outlined here, its paradigm 
of applying ABC accounting tied to a carbon cap offers a tractable climate policy not just for 
biofuels, but for transportation fuels generally. Cap-and-trade creates a price signal that fosters 
economic efficiency and, given adequate integrity and transparency, enables an extension of 
carbon management to uncapped sectors and sources. An ABC approach provides mechanisms 
for handling challenges of policy diffusion and problems of leakage due to the impossibility of 
imposing caps everywhere at once. It is therefore well suited for addressing biofuels, which 
involve uncapped sectors (agriculture and forestry) and indirect impacts in uncapped 
jurisdictions across international borders. Although cap-and-trade would offer the ideal 
framework, ABC accounting mechanisms could be adapted to other forms of policy such as 
direct carbon regulation or carbon taxation.  
As for recently adopted policies that attempt to regulate fuel-related GHG emissions on a 
lifecycle basis, careful consideration reveals that specifying policy through LCA is premised on a 
logical fallacy. The problem is that of imputing to a product all of the emissions impacts of the 
complex systems involved in its production. Real-world fuel products derive from commodity 
and agro-industrial systems whose spatial and temporal boundaries cannot be circumscribed in 
ways that are at once traceable and sufficiently complete to ensure environmental integrity. 
Viewed through a lifecycle lens, automatic crediting of biogenic carbon uptake may appear 
arithmetically correct. However, the result is a misplaced burden of proof. Fuel suppliers and 
end-users are relieved of counting the CO2 "emission certain" from biofuel combustion while no 
clear accountability is established for the production emissions (direct and indirect) that occur in 
the diverse and dynamic supply chains for feedstocks, fuels and their associated inputs.  
While it may be discomfiting to some readers, the conclusion is that LCA is inappropriate for 
specifying regulations. Although LCA may be a useful research tool and can helpfully inform 
policy discussions, its literal application for policy specification is a mistake. Disputes over LCA 
regulatory outcomes are unproductive and ultimately unresolvable; defining policy with ABC 
accounting offers a way out of this morass. Developing ABC-based fuel-sector policies offers a 
near-term path forward, at least in jurisdictions such as California and the European Union that 
have made serious commitments to limit GHG emissions, and can begin to put in place an 
DeCicco -- Biofuels and Carbon Management p. 18 / 21 
accounting framework that will stand the test of time as other jurisdictions face up to the climate 
threat. It is not feasible to establish anytime soon (if indeed ever) the type of global policy 
covering energy and other industrial sources as well as land suggested as ideal by Wise et al. 
(2009). However, it is possible to establish sound ABC accounting protocols (whether voluntary 
or mandatory) in successive jurisdictions, thereby guiding markets toward emissions-limiting 
decisions that will at least enhance the prospects for major technology and system changes that 
are truly climate friendly.  
In summary, adherence to direct, source- and sink-based, current-period accounting provides a 
robust framework for handling emissions from fuels regardless of their origin. Fully including 
transportation fuels under a carbon cap would put the majority of the sector's emissions under 
carbon management. Biofuels have come to present a special problem because biogenic carbon is 
excluded from fossil-based caps as proposed to date even though (like most forms of bioenergy) 
their production is intrinsically coupled to terrestrial carbon stocks. However, these issues can be 
handled through an ABC approach that accounts for all fuel end-use CO2 emissions at a well-
specified point of regulation; a protocol to track carbon uptake and uncapped emissions in fuel 
and feedstock supply chains; and a land protection fund to mitigate leakage from ILUC. Such an 
approach will create a sound carbon management framework for the sector and in so doing, 
move policy closer to the integrated treatment of fossil energy and terrestrial GHG sources 
ultimately needed for effective climate protection.   
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